On Jan 11, 2:55 pm, gianluca.orte...@nsn.com wrote:

First of all - there was no definition of the scheme, just some
mumbling that only give very vague idea about what you want to do. But
even from that it is clear to see that many active attacks (with man
in the middle) break the scheme completely. (f.e. attacker pretends to
be a server and after one single answer from your client, attacker
already knows everything about how to authenticate him/her self to a
real server).
Even if we forget about the most devastating attack on your "protocol"
when attacker is able to intersect communication between client and
server and replace server's public key with attackers' own public key
- you still have lots of extra openings for new attack on your
protocol. Take for example your "reversible obfuscation of the
password". How do you "encrypt reversibly obfuscated" password? Is it
RSA encrypted or RSA enveloped? If it is RSA encrypted, what padding
scheme you use? If you use good padding - what is the reason for you
"reversible obfuscation of password"? Your obfuscation can not improve
security of your protocol, but it can however introduce a lot of
weaknesses! Since it is reversible you have to assume that algorithm
is known to attacker (see Auguste Kerckhoff's 6 rules of secure system
design that he expressed in 1883!). That means that control over "a
random number that is sent from server" gives attacker possibility to
do lots of extra bits twigging and open lots of new vectors of
attack.
What you wrote was not(!) in any way description of secure protocol.
You want to see how secure protocol is described - check definition of
standard security protocols! But remember that even with these
protocols, lots of things are still omitted from the description (such
as some security proofs and assumptions), but assumes familiarity with
articles referred from the standard protocol description.

-Valery